An accessible introduction to the many intersections between the work of David Foster Wallace and the world of philosophical inquiry.

The Description for this book, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, will be forthcoming.

In Entailment, Anderson and Belnap motivated their modification E of Ackermann’s strenge Implikation Π Π’ as a logic of relevance and necessity. The kindred system R was seen as relevant but not as modal. Our systems of Peano arithmetic R# and omega arithmetic R## were based on R to avoid fallacies of relevance. But problems arose as to which arithmetic sentences were (relevantly) true. Here we base analogous systems on E to solve those problems. Central to motivating E is the (...) rejection of fallacies of modality. Our slogan here for this is, “No diamonds entail any boxes.” Form the strenge Peano arithmetic E# like R#, adding appropriate forms of the Peano axioms to Ackermann’s E.. (shrink)

Is faith that p compatible with disbelief that p? I argue that it is. After surveying some recent literature on the compatibility of propositional and non-propositional forms of faith with the lack of belief, I take the next step and offer several arguments for the thesis that both these forms of faith are also compatible, in certain cases, with outright disbelief. This is contrary to the views of some significant recent commentators on propositional faith, including Robert Audi and Daniel (...) Howard-Snyder. The primary argument revolves around the possibility of maintaining a single faith through drastic changes in cognitive attitude. I argue that once we allow that propositional faith is compatible with weaker cognitive attitudes than belief, such as acceptance or assent, there is prima facie reason to consider propositional faith as sometimes compatible with disbelief. I then consider objections and offer some final reflections on the significance of the thesis. (shrink)

Philosophers of modern logic have cherished no project more dearly than that of extensional reduction. Despite occasional protests that this project was ill-conceived from the start, or that it fails to account for important areas of experience and thought, the extensionalist mills have been grinding away anyhow. Their grinding has brought with it a number of important technical successes, replete with philosophical claims that light has finally been shed on areas hitherto buried in incomprehensible darkness.

A major question for the relevant logics has been, “Under what conditions is Ackermann's ruleγ from -A ∨B andA to inferB, admissible for one of these logics?” For a large number of logics and theories, the question has led to an affirmative answer to theγ problem itself, so that such an answer has almost come to be expected for relevant logics worth taking seriously. We exhibit here, however, another large and interesting class of logics-roughly, the Boolean extensions of theW — (...) free relevant logics (and, precisely, the well-behaved subsystems of the 4-valued logicBN4) — for which γ fails. (shrink)

We further develop a recent new proof (by Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger—GHZ) that local deterministic hidden-variable theories are inconsistent with certain strict correlations predicted by quantum mechanics. First, we generalize GHZ's proof so that it applies to factorable stochastic theories, theories in which apparatus hidden variables are causally relevant to measurement results, and theories in which the hidden variables evolve indeterministically prior to the particle-apparatus interactions. Then we adopt a more general measure-theoretic approach which requires that GHZ's argument be modified (...) in order to produce a valid proof. Finally, we motivate our more general proof's assumptions in a somewhat different way from previous authors in order to strengthen the implications of our proof as much as possible. After developing GHZ's proof along these lines, we then consider the analogue, for our proof, of Bohr's reply to the EPR argument, and conclude (pace GHZ) that in at least one respect (viz. that of most concern to Bohr) the proof is no more powerful than Bell's. Nevertheless, we point out some new advantages of our proof over Bell's, and over other algebraic proofs of nonlocality. And we conclude by giving a modified version of our proof that, like Bell's, does not rely on experimentally unrealizable strict correlations, but still leads to a testable “quasi-algebraic” locality inequality.“... to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics.”J. S. Bell. (shrink)

Within medical ethics, there is widespread agreement that morally valid consent includes an understanding condition. Disagreement centers on what is meant by that understanding condition. Tom Dougherty proposed that this understanding condition should be divided into the two mutually exclusive categories of descriptive information and contextual information. Further, Dougherty argues that each type of information is necessary to satisfy the understanding condition. In contrast, I argue that when the deontic aspect of valid consent is in view, each type of information (...) can be sufficient to satisfy the understanding condition on its own. Moreover, by analyzing delegation, which is conceptually related to consent since both are morally transformative actions, I show that delegation often depends not on descriptive or contextual information but on trust. So, I argue that trustworthiness can also be a type of information that does the same work as descriptive and contextual information in satisfying the understanding condition for valid consent. (shrink)

In this paper, we shall confine ourselves to the study of sentential constants in the system R of relevant implication.In dealing with the behaviour of the sentential constants in R, we shall think of R itself as presented in three stages, depending on the level of truth-functional involvement.

Philosophers, psychiatrists, and social scientists would welcome clarification of the distinction between rational and irrational desires. It may be proper to say that rational desires are those which manifest rationality. But since this seems a rather unilluminating characterization, philosophers sometimes offer definitions of what constitute such manifestations of rationality. I shall consider definitions provided by John Rawls and Richard Brandt. Their definitions are unsatisfactory mainly because they include subjunctive conditionals. An alternative approach, which avoids conditionals, is attractive. But it encounters (...) so many additional problems that I shall conclude that we are not now in a position to define rationality in this area and must treat it as a state or disposition which to date has only been partially characterized. Thus, if we want a definition of the difference between rational and irrational desires, we must at present settle for the rather unexciting one mentioned above. (shrink)

'The book is clearly written and makes available a wide range of issues concerning the style of Bacon's writings and his politics. Highly recommended to both general and academic libraries at all levels.'-CHOICE.

This article provides a brief introduction to the interplay between law and religion in the health care context. First, I address the extent to which the commitments of a faith tradition may be written into laws that bind all citizens, including those who do not share those commitments. Second, I discuss the law’s accommodation of the faith commitments of individual health care providers—hardly a static inquiry, as the degree of accommodation is increasingly contested. Third, I expand the discussion to include (...) institutional health care providers, arguing that the legal system’s resistance to accommodating the morally distinct identities of institutional providers reflects a short-sighted view of the liberty of conscience. Finally, I offer some tentative thoughts about why these dynamics become even more complicated in the context of Islamic health care providers. (shrink)

In Grassroots Spirituality, Robert Forman documents an important and profound shift in the nature of spirituality in North America, that strongly influences Europe as well. His exciting survey graphically illustrates the possibility of this "grassroots" movement shaping a creative era that responds to new and old needs of religiosity.

There has been a long-standing debate about the roles of San in the militaries of southern Africa and the prevalence of violence among the Ju/'hoansi and other San people. The evolutionary anthropology and social anthropological debates over the contexts in which violence and warfare occurs among hunters and gatherers are considered, as is the “tribal zone theory” of warfare between states and indigenous people. This paper assesses the issues that arise from these discussions, drawing on data from San in Angola, (...) Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. Utilizing cases of how San have been affected by military forces and wildlife conservation agencies in what became protected areas in southern Africa, this article shows that indigenous peoples have been treated differentially by state and nongovernmental organizations involved in anti-poaching, shoot-to-kill, and forced resettlement policies. Particular emphasis is placed on the!Xun and Khwe San of southern Angola and northern Namibia and the Tshwa San of western Zimbabwe and northern Botswana, who have been impacted by militarization and coercive conservation efforts since the late nineteenth century. Principal conclusions are that conservation and militarization efforts have led to a reduction in land and resources available to indigenous people, higher levels of poverty, increased socioeconomic stratification, and lower levels of physical well-being. San have responded to these trends by engaging in social activism, forming community-based institutions, and pursuing legal actions aimed at obtaining human rights and equitable treatment. (shrink)

In “Conditions and Analyses of Knowledge”, Robert Shope focuses on the conditions that must be satisfied for a person to have knowledge, specifically knowledge that something is so. Traditionally, knowledge has been analyzed in terms of justified true belief. Shope addresses philosophers’ disagreements concerning the truth and belief conditions. After introducing the justification condition, he presents challenges that have provoked several attempts to replace or to supplement the justification condition for knowledge. Shope presents and assesses several of these, including (...) early causal theories, the nonaccidentality requirement, reliable process and conditional analyses, the reliable‐indicator analysis, the conclusive reasons analysis, defeasibility analyses, analyses in terms of cognitive or intellectual virtues, and proper functionalism as well as his own account of knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Narrowing the Scope Culture Learning Styles Confronting Racism Philosophical and Conceptual Issues.